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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






RODNEY HANDY, JR., 
 




LEELONI PALMIERO, INDIVIDUALLY;  
SGT.  BALDOMERO, INDIVIDUALLY;  
DETECTIVE ROBERT HAGY, INDIVIDUALLY;  
DETECTIVE HORGER, INDIVIDUALLY;  
DETECTIVE SULLIVAN, INDIVIDUALLY;  
DOES 1-10, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; 
COMMISSIONER PHILADELPHIA POLICE;  
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, C/O LAW DEPARTMENT 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-03107) 
Honorable Juan R. Sanchez, U.S. District Judge 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
November 17, 2020 
 
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
 
















KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Rodney Handy challenges the District Court’s grant of qualified 
immunity on summary judgment to the officers who conducted a search of his home that 
did not result in charges.  He also disputes the Court’s dismissal of his remaining state law 




Before addressing the merits of Handy’s contentions regarding immunity, we first 
consider his argument that Appellees waived qualified immunity by failing to timely file 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), and we 
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a grant of 
summary judgment de novo, see Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d 
Cir. 2016), and will affirm if, “[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant, . . . there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact [such] that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,’” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 
248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review decisions regarding the waiver of an affirmative 
defense and the declination of supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.  See 
Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2012); Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. 




their answer to the amended complaint.  We review the District Court’s decision 
regarding the waiver of an affirmative defense for abuse of discretion.  Sharp v. Johnson, 
669 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2012).  While qualified immunity is an affirmative defense 
that normally should be asserted in an answer, it also may be raised in a motion for 
summary judgment unless (1) the defendant has failed to demonstrate “a reasonable 
modicum of diligence in raising the defense” and (2) “the plaintiff has been prejudiced by 
the delay.”  Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).   
Here, the District Court properly rejected Handy’s waiver argument because, 
despite Appellees’ questionable diligence in prosecuting the case generally, Handy failed 
to show any actual prejudice.  See Sharp, 669 F.3d at 158.  Handy’s Fourth Amendment 
claim and Appellees’ claim for immunity turn on the resolution of the same factual 
question—whether the search of Handy’s home was supported by probable cause—and 
Handy had ample opportunity to develop the record on this question during discovery, 
irrespective of Appellees’ delay.  Indeed, Handy simply catalogs the negative 
consequences of delay without demonstrating that Appellees’ conduct actually 
“imped[ed] [his] ability to prepare a full and complete defense.”  Ware v. Rodale Press, 
Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2003).  Without more, “these possibilities are not in 
themselves enough to demonstrate that [Handy] cannot receive a fair trial” and therefore 
suffered prejudice.  United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971).  Thus, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Appellees to raise their qualified 




B. Qualified Immunity 
Turning to the substance of Handy’s appeal, we address his assertion that the 
District Court erred in concluding that Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity.  
This doctrine will shield state actors “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).   
In the Fourth Amendment context, defendants are “presumptively entitled to 
qualified immunity from . . . claims premised on a lack of probable cause,” where they 
“relie[d] in good faith on a prosecutor’s legal opinion,” id. at 255–56, or the approval of a 
neutral magistrate, Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012).  Of course, 
such circumstances do not automatically confer immunity because the touchstone is “the 
‘objective reasonableness’ of [their] belief in the lawfulness of [their] actions.”  
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997).  Thus, a plaintiff may rebut the 
reasonableness of the officers’ reliance—and therefore their presumptive immunity—by 
establishing that “the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”  United States v. 
Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 663–64 (3d Cir. 2012).   
Handy, however, has failed to meet the “high” threshold to rebut this presumption.  
Id. at 664.  He raises several challenges to the validity and contents of the probable cause 
affidavit, but none casts doubt on Appellees’ reliance on the prosecutor’s legal opinion 
and the Magistrate Judge’s approval of the warrant as “the clearest indication that the 




For example, despite Handy’s objections to the strength of the evidence in the affidavit, 
he makes no claim that the affidavit was merely a “bare bones” submission.  Pavulak, 
700 F.3d at 664.  Indeed, far from “rely[ing] [solely] on an officer’s unsupported belief 
that probable cause exists,” the affidavit “had been prepared using first-hand 
information,” including Handy’s admission that he owned and stored at his home a 
handgun matching the cartridge casings recovered from the scene.  Id. at 664.  And 
although the affidavit is not in the record, we have no reason to doubt the Magistrate’s 
acknowledgment or the evidence supporting the document’s existence, such as the 
reference to its attachment in the warrant itself and Detective Palmiero’s testimony 
regarding its contents.2   
In short, it was “objectively reasonable,” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 555, for 
Appellees to rely on the prosecutor’s and Magistrate’s endorsements that there was 
probable cause to search Handy’s home and, in the absence of a “genuine issue as to any 
material fact” on that subject, Kelly, 622 F.3d at 253, Appellees are entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
C. State Law Claims 
Finally, while conceding that his claim for defamation is time-barred, Handy 
argues that the District Court erred in dismissing, rather than remanding, his remaining 
 
2 Handy also argues spoliation on appeal, but he has waived this argument by 
failing to raise it below, see Orie v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cty., 946 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 
2019), and, regardless, he has not alleged any facts indicating “actual suppression or 
withholding of evidence” to support his contention, Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 




state law claims and further erred in dismissing them with prejudice, which he suggests 
will preclude his refiling in state court.  Handy is mistaken on both counts.  Once the 
District Court resolved his federal law claims, it was well within its discretion to dismiss 
his state law claims, as no “considerations of judicial economy, convenience, [or] fairness 
to the parties” justified the continued exercise of pendent jurisdiction.  North Sound 
Capital LLC v. Merck & Co., 938 F.3d 482, 494 n.11 (3d Cir. 2019).  And, although the 
District Court did not specify whether it was dismissing Handy’s state law claims with or 
without prejudice, that dismissal is deemed to be without prejudice because it was not 
accompanied by a “clear and explicit statement” that it was “with prejudice.”  Papera v. 
Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2020).  As a dismissal without 
prejudice does “‘not operat[e] as an adjudication upon the merits,’ . . . and thus does not 
have a [claim-preclusive] effect,” id., nothing in the styling of the District Court’s 
decision prevents Handy from refiling in state court or warrants remand.   
II. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
